The correspondence theory of truth has experienced something of a revival recently in the form of the Truthmaker Axiom: whatever is true, something makes it true. We consider various postulates which have been proposed to characterize truthmaking, in particular, the Disjunction Thesis (DT), that whatever makes a disjunction true must make one or other disjunct true. In conjunction with certain other assumptions, DT leads to triviality. We show that there are elaborations of truthmaking on which DT holds (which must therefore take steps to avoid the triviality); but that there are more plausible accounts of truthmaking on which DT fails.
Truthmakers
The correspondence theory of truth has experienced something of a revival recently in the development of a theory of "truthmaking". The fundamental idea is that whatever is true is so in virtue of something which makes it true.
1 Let s † p read: s makes the proposition p true. The basic thesis may be stated as follows: Postulate 1.1 THE TRUTHMAKER AXIOM(TA) For all p, if p is true then there is something, s, such that s † p.
2
What function as truthmakers, s, may be states of affairs (see Armstrong 1997 , Bigelow 1998 , tropes (concrete properties, sometimes called moments or abstract particulars) (see Mulligan et al. 1984, p. 293) , facts, proofs (see Sundholm 1994) , or whatever.
3 Mulligan et al. (1984, p. 313 ) and Bigelow (1988, pp. 132-3) do not endorse TA in its full generality. Rather than enter into a detailed metaphysics of the nature of truthmakers, the theory of truthmaking works top-down by explicating the roles which truthmakers play-by formulating the postulates which they must satisfy.
Nonetheless, certain intuitions come into play. For example, a multiplicity of truthmakers is envisaged-so that an argument such as Davidson's (1969) that there is only one fact, would reduce the theory to absurdity ("truthmaker monism" in §3 below). But Davidson's argument depends on the slingshot technique, which is a fallacy (see, e.g., Read 1993 ). Yet again, truthmakers should not be too disparate-it should be possible for propositions to share truthmakers, as the Entailment Thesis, below, will require. What is sought is an interesting structure of objects whose existence suffices to explain the truth of propositions. But, to repeat, rather than speculate directly about the nature of these objects, the novel strategy is to explore the structure directly. Central to this strategy is the "correspondence intuition", that truth (of propositions or whatever) requires an explanation in the form of something which makes that truth true.
Some think TA is in itself realist. But it could be accepted by some antirealists, for example Dummett (1978, p. 14 Mulligan et al. (1984, pp. 313-4) ; Restall (1996, p. 333) . Indeed, Fox and Bigelow both define truthmaking in such a way that FC follows. Let p ⇒ q read: p entails q. Then their reductive definition reads: s † p iff s exists and s exists ⇒ p (Fox 1987, p. 189; Bigelow 1988, p. 127) , that is, there is something whose existence entails p. This couples to the "correspondence intuition" the belief that the connection between the truth of a truthbearer and the existence of its truthmaker is internal, that is, an entailment.
Theorem 1.1 CORRESPONDENCE INTUITION (CI) For all p, p is true iff ∃s s † p.
Proof: Left-to-right is TA, right-to-left is FC. One underlying idea which no author seems to make explicit is the thought that every truthmaker makes some proposition true, that is, that every truth can be expressed: Postulate 1.4 EXPRESSIBILITY (EX) For all s, there is some p such that s † p. Postulate 1.4 is an expressibility thesis, since it captures the idea that some proposition can express each truth, that is, that there is always a proposition to express the content of any truthmaker. Thus not only do truthmakers function to make propositions true (TA and FC) , that is all they do. There is no truthmaker which cannot be expressed (EX).
Since the existence of truthmakers entails the truth of propositions (Fox 1987, p. 189) Armstrong (1997, p. 130); Mulligan et al. (1984, p. 316); Restall (1996, p. 332 Armstrong (1997, p. 197); Restall (1996, pp. 333, 338 
Truthmakers and logical truth
What makes logical truths true? TA is unrestricted, saying that all truths have a truthmaker. However, those committed to classical or intuitionistic logic, in which any proposition entails each logical truth, find that necessity supervenes on contingency, that is, that all logical necessities are made true by the truthmakers of contingent truths. What is more, it follows that every truthmaker makes every necessary truth true: Restall (1996, p. 333) . Proof: suppose p is logically true, and let s be an arbitrary truthmaker. Then, by EX, for some q, s † q. In classical or intuitionistic logic, anything entails a logical truth, so q ⇒ p. Hence by ET, s † p. If one dislikes the idea of logical truths being made true by merely contingent truthmakers-or by anything at all-one cannot avoid GSN by restricting TA to contingent truths, for TA is not used in its proof. Nor can one exclude logical truths from TA on pain of contradiction. Wittgenstein avoided it in the Tractatus only at the cost of denying that logical propositions were propositions at all.
One might think that, even in a weaker logic, such as R (see Anderson and Belnap 1975 and , in which q ⇒ p does not hold of every necessary truth p, necessity is still supervenient in a weaker (local) sense, namely, that some contingent truthmaker suffices to show that each necessity is true. For suppose p is logically true, and q is not, but nonetheless true. Then p&q is true, but contingently so. Since p&q is true ∃s s † p&q by TA. Since p&q ⇒ p, s † p by ET. So any logical truth is made true by some contingent truthmaker.
But this is sophistical. We can see why only when we have considered what makes conjunctions true. Further postulates are often stated in which truthmaking distributes over conjunction and disjunction. However, they do not follow from the previous postulates without further assumptions about the nature of truthmakers. Hence, unless they are to be presented as basic postulates, we need to state further conditions on truthmaking. Armstrong (1997, p. 122); Fox (1987, p. 189) . It follows that the "part of" relation preserves truthmaking: See Armstrong 1997, p. 130; Mulligan et al. 1984, pp. 297, 315 . Proof: if s=t the result is trivial. So suppose s⊆t. Then for some u, t = s + u and so by EX there is some q such that u † q. So by TF, t † p&q, whence by ET, t † p. We can now see why the argument for local supervenience is sophistical. What makes p&q true does indeed make p true. But what makes p&q true? Only if we assume that the supposed logical truth p has no special truthmaker does the supervenience thesis follow-that is, the argument is circular. The idea of supervenience is that the truth of logical necessities should follow from what makes contingent truths true whatever those truths are. Suppose p is a logical truth and q contingent, and suppose s † p and r † q. Then s+r † p&q, so s+r † p. But we can infer that the truth of p supervenes on contingent truth only if the existence of s+r supervenes on that of the contingent truthmakers.
Theorem 2.2 TRUTHMAKER PRESERVATION (TP) For all s, t and p, if s † p and s ⊆ t then t † p.
Indeed, aspects of the relevant logic E of entailment refute the supervenience of logical necessity. For Coffa (1975) showed that in that logic, roughly speaking, whatever entails a logical necessity is itself a logical necessity. This result needs clarification and refinement. For example, as we noted in AD (Theorem 1.3), p ⇒ p∨q and so p ⇒ p∨¬p. Moreover, as in the sophistical argument, p&q ⇒ p even if p is necessary and q contingent. Let N be the set of necessitives of E, that is, the set of formulae of E which are equivalent to a formula of the form p, where " " is necessity. Excluding the above cases, Coffa defined a sub-class S(N) of N containing, e.g., p ⇒ p and its like-entailments-and showed that each member of S(N) is entailed, in E, only by members of S(N), or by their conjunction with other wffs. Hence their truth cannot supervene on contingent truthmaking.
That observation leaves us with a large question: what then does make logical truths true? But it is not the question with which this paper is concerned. That is the question, what makes disjunctions true? This reduces truthmaking to absurdity. Restall dubs it "truthmaker monism". It is certainly true that, by an iteration of TF and ET, it may be plausible to conclude that there is some unimaginably huge fusion of states of affairs ("the world"-Armstrong 1997, p. 263) which makes every truth true. Such a truthmaker would be like a model, negation-complete in that what it did not make true it would make false. But that is the exception. The interest of truthmaking lies in the articulation of that global truthmaker into distinct truthmaking parts. So it is absurd to learn that every state of affairs (e.g. that the sky is blue) makes every truth true (e.g. that the table is brown).
The threat of triviality
Restall's response is to retain DT⇒ and deny GSN. We noted earlier that only advocates of classical or intuitionistic logic are committed to GSN-and only advocates of the former are committed to Excluded Middle.
6 I certainly do not wish to defend GSN. What I wish to show in what follows is that DT⇒ is suspect independently of Restall's argument, and that Restall's arguments in support of it are themselves fallacious.
Disjunction and negation
If DT⇒ is false, why should one think it true? A number of explanations are possible. One is the parallel with CT and CT⇐. If truthmaking distributes over conjunction, should it not also distribute over disjunction? But CT (specifically, CT⇐) depends on the fusion operation of mereology. Just as the conjuncts are made true by parts of what makes the conjunction true (cf. TF), so what makes a disjunction true is part of what makes the disjuncts true. The disjuncts, and so what make them true, are more specific. But this thought yields only the innocuous theses: Theorem 4.1
if s † p & q then ∃t, u, s = t + u such that t † p and u † q;

if s † p ∨ q then ∃t, s ⊆ t such that t † p or t † q.
Proof:
1. immediate from Theorem 3.1. 6 A further line of investigation, especially for followers of Dummett, would be to keep GSN and DT while adopting intuitionistic logic in which one can show that whenever a disjunction is provable so is one or other disjunct. See, e.g., van Dalen (1986, p. 266 So either way, ∃t = s+u such that t † p or t † q. The second possible ground for favouring DT⇒ is a confusion between DT (and CT) and the corresponding truth-conditions:
p & q is true iff p is true and q is true (T&) and p ∨ q is true iff p is true or q is true.
(T∨) These are sound principles, possibly even expressive of the meaning of "&" and "∨" (see Tarski 1956, p. 170) . But a further sound principle is ¬p is true iff p is not true.
(T¬) Just as T& and CT are similar in form, as are T∨ and DT, so are T¬ and
(NT) But NT is clearly false in general. Suppose we agree that the fact that the sky is blue does not make it true that the table is brown, for truthmaker monism is absurd. NT infers from this that the fact that the sky is blue makes it true that the table is not brown! NT is a good defining criterion of a global truthmaker, the world. But most truthmakers are (negation-) incomplete.
What is the case is that for the table not to be brown it is necessary (and arguably, sufficient) that nothing makes it true that it is brown: Theorem 4.2 For all p ∃s s † ¬p iff ∀s, s / † p. (NT′) (Mulligan et al.1984, p. 315 
If we were committed to DT⇒, we would needs infer that either r+s † p or r+s † q. Yet this is implausible. For r tells us (perhaps) only that m (so is indeterminate whether p or q), and s tells us that m → p ∨ q (i.e., that m implies p ∨ q, or that if m then p or q) but that again seems genuinely agnostic about which of p or q does obtain.
One might think that, taking "→" to be material implication, "⊃", this agnosticism is impossible. For if s † m ⊃ p ∨ q, either s † ¬m or s † p ∨ q, so since r † m, s † p ∨ q and so either s † p or s † q. But this reasoning already depends on DT, first, that if s † ¬m ∨ p ∨ q then either s † ¬m or s † p ∨ q, and secondly that if s † p ∨ q then either s † p or s † q.
What I am claiming, however, is not that it is impossible to maintain DT-we'll see (Theorem 6.1) that analysing s † p in terms of implication and construing implication suitably, DT can be proven. Rather, I want to urge that DT is implausible. We can see this by looking closer at the above schematic example.
Suppose, for example, that m reads "there's a horse race", and p ∨ q reads "either Valentine or Epitaph will win". Then the local conditions, s, may be such as to favour Valentine or Epitaph over the others, that is, s † m → p ∨ q. Suppose that, in these circumstances, there is a horse race: r † m. Then either Valentine or Epitaph will win. Indeed, only one of them will win. But r+s, the holding of the race in these circumstances, does not itself decide which of the two will win. No doubt there are other facts about the race, not least the fact of who wins it, which decide that issue. But it is not unreasonable to claim that those are further facts, or truthmakers, distinct from r+s, the holding of the race in conditions under which either Valentine or Epitaph will win.
Thus what really lies behind DT⇒ is an aversion to disjunctive truthmakers. The holding of the horse race in particular conditions (r+s) is enough to favour Valentine and Epitaph over the other horses. But it is not enough to decide between them. So it makes a disjunction true without itself making either disjunct true. Accordingly, it is not difficult to articulate theories of truthmaking which are consistent with the rejection of DT⇒. Suppose, for example, that we define truthmaking as do Fox (1987, p. 189) and Bigelow (1988, p. 127) , and that we identify entailment with strict implication. Then we can show that DT fails.
Theorem 4.4 Let s † p mean "s exists and s exists ⇒ p", abbreviate "s exists" as "σ" and let "⇒" be strict implication, " ". Then DT is invalid:
Proof: Take a model with three worlds, w 1 , w 2 and w 3 , each world accessible to itself, and w 2 and w 3 each accessible to w 1 ; and let σ be true at all three worlds, p true at w 1 and w 2 and q true at w 1 and w 3 . Then the antecedent of DT is true, since s ⊃p∨q is true at all three worlds, but the consequent is false, since σ ⊃p is false at w 3 and σ ⊃q is false at w 2 . Restall (1996, pp. 335-6) gives a further argument in favour of DT. Suppose it does not hold of "or", he says. Then we can introduce a new connective, * ("shmor"), stipulating that
Or and shmor
(Shmor) It follows that "*" satisfies p*q is true iff p is true or q is true.
(T*) Proof: suppose p is true. Then by TA, ∃s s † p, whence by Shmor, s † p*q, so by FC, p*q is true. Similarly if q is true, so is p * q.
Conversely, suppose p*q is true. Then by TA, ∃s s † p*q, whence again by Shmor, s † p or s † q, so by FC, either p or q is true.
So "or" and "shmor" (*) are necessarily equivalent (by T∨ and T*). Restall defies the reader not to conclude that "or" is "shmor". If so, DT (= Shmor) is true of "or".
The argument is fallacious. Recall that NT was absurd. But by reasoning parallel to Restall's, we could introduce a new connective, √ ("shnot"), stipulating that Thus "not" and "shnot" (√) are necessarily equivalent (by T¬ and T√). Restall should, therefore, defy us to deny that "not" is "shnot". If it is, NT is true of "not". But NT is false.
What is wrong with Restall's reasoning? The case of Shnot and NT should make that clear. There is no such connective as "shnot". One cannot simply define a connective into existence. Such definitions need to satisfy appropriate conditions (see, e.g., Belnap 1961-2 and Read 1988, Ch. 9) . But no such assurance has been given. Indeed, the above derivation shows that it is not consistent: given the postulates TA, TF and ET, introducing "shnot" leads to absurdity-truthmaker monism-and so is illegitimate; so "not" does not satisfy NT. Similarly for "shmor": in the context of GSN and NC, it is not legitimate to introduce "shmor" satisfying Shmor. Hence, there must be conceptions of truthmaking on which "or" does not satisfy the Disjunction Thesis.
Conclusion
The correspondence insight is that what is true is made so by the existence of something else. What that is, is a matter of dispute and further elaboration. But the basic insight can be codified in the Truthmaker Axiom, TA. To this basic thesis, further postulates can be added: that what is made true really is true (FC), that every truthmaker makes something true (EX) and that truthmakers make true all the consequences of what they make truethat truthmaking is closed under logical consequence (ET).
Some authors have, however, been bolder in their claims for truthmaking, holding for example that necessity supervenes on contingent truthmaking and that truthmaking distributes over conjunction and disjunction. GSN is indeed hard to avoid if one is beholden to classical or intuitionistic logic, following immediately from EX and ET. But if one adopts a weaker logic such as R or E, for its more careful and refined handling of entailment, it transpires that necessity is far from supervenient. 7 In fact, this argument shows that Shnot entails truthmaker monism. Suppose p is true but ∃s s / † p. By Shnot, s † √p and by TA, ∃r, r † p. So by TF r+s † p & √p, whence r+s † p and r+s † √p, so by Shnot again, r+s / † p. Contradiction, so for all s, s † p.
Turning to the case of conjunction, we saw that even CT⇐ goes beyond the basic insight, and depends on further elaboration of the structure of truthmakers (TF).
8 For the case of disjunction, the issue is highly sensitive. It is absurd to suppose that truthmaking generally distributes over negation (NT).
9 Why, then, suppose it distributes over disjunction? It is possible to present an analysis of the truthmaker relation (e.g., that s † p iff s exists and if s exists then p, where "if" is material implication, or the Stalnaker-Lewis conditional), from which the Disjunction Thesis, DT, follows: Proof: Right-to-left follows from Theorem 1.3, as we noted. For the converse, let σ abbreviate "s exists", as before. Note that σ &(σ ⊃p) is equivalent to σ &p. Thus, if ⇒ is ⊃, DT⇒ reads
which is a case of the distribution of & over ∨. If ⇒ is >, the result follows from centering, that is, that if σ is true, σ >p (that p be true in the closest σ-world) again reduces to σ &p.
But if one does adopt DT-as a further basic postulate, or as such a result of further elaboration of truthmaking-triviality ("truthmaker monism") will ensue in the context of classical logic. One might avoid that consequence by choosing a weaker logic, as Restall does (1996, p. 339) , or as I suggested Dummett might, since intuitionistic logic has the Disjunction Property. Or one can try to avoid it by restricting TA to logically simple propositions (cf. Mulligan et al. 1984, p. 314 )-if one believes there are such propositions. But one does not have to take that course, for one can-indeed, should-reject DT.
When properly thought through, and in the absence of some result such as the Disjunction Property, it is implausible (as DT⇒ claims) that only what makes p or q true can make p∨q true, regardless of whether one adopts classical logic or something weaker. Indeed, there are plausible accounts of truthmaking, on which DT can be disproven. Closely associ-ated with the correspondence insight, for example, is the Fox/Bigelow idea that truth supervenes on how things are-that truthmakers entail that true propositions are true, (see Armstrong 1997, p. 129) . If one models entailment with a modal connective such as (strict implication) or the modal ⇒ of R or E, 10 then DT is false.
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